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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. In Appellants Brief ('"AB") respondents have not contested paragraph 1-5, 8-9, and 11, but
have opposed paragraphs 6-7 and 10 (AB-5).
2. The respondents claim that ·'In para&rraph 6 and 7, '·Lightner appears to be introducing.for
the first time on appeal evidt'nce that is no1 part <~lthe record below ... ·· and that paragraph

10 is ..erroneous''. (Respondents Brief ''RB" -1 ).
3. An abbreviated view of the undisputed facts contained in the record stated that:
a) Appellant was on parole (R. 14 para 19);
b) Appellant paid $600.00 for cost of supervision fees (R. 14 para 20):
c) This payment was in exchange for services providing him with parole credits (R. 14
para 20);
d) Defendants/respondents did not count any of Appeilants properly fuifiiled parole time
towards the completion of his sentence (R. 14 para 21 ); and
e) Defendants/respondents did not refund any of the cost of suoervision fees for the

services Appellant had paid for (R. 14 para 21 ).
4. This case never reached argument stage. The case was dismissed even prior to Appellant
being able to respond to defendanf s initial motion. Consequently, the record in this case
has many gaps and is not complete. The district court prematurely dismissed the case prior
to many of the facts and/or arguments being submitted.
5. Although there may be gaps in the record. the undisclosed information, documented or not,
remain facts of the case. Respondent·s reason to dispute these clarifying facts and hold this
court "in the dark·· is that each fact admitted adds to the claim for which relief can be
granted.
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6. Respondents therefore present case law, such as Nelson v. Nelson; Obenchain v. McAlvain
Const Inc.; Hansen v. Devaney and Huerta v Huerta (all citations listed in RB-I) as reasons
not to allow clarification and the additional facts of the case that would have been part of
the record if not dismissed prematurely.
7. Without these facts in the record, respondents rely on the hope that this court, not having a
full understanding of the issues, will assume the facts to faJL as the district court did, in
their favor. Yet Appellant is entitled to have ail inferences in the record viewed in his
favor.

Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. 129 Id 171, 175, 923 P2d 416 (1996). One

question before this court "is not whether the p/aint[ff will ultimately prevail. hut whether

the party is entided to offer evidence to support the ciaims" Brooksb} v. Geico General
Ins. Co. 153 Id 546,547,286 P.3d 182, 183 (2012). The only reasons respondents would
object to presenting clarifying facts is because additional facts strengthen Appellants claim,
or they have something to hide and/or cover up.
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ISSlJES ON APPEAL
8. For argument purposes, respondents rewrote the issues presented on appeal to their liking.

(It appears that in this instance, contrary to the statemem to the case, respondents don't
mind, and are actually searching for clarity).

ISSUE ONE- Statute of Limitations
9. Although disputed in the record, this was not included in the courts reason to dismiss.

Having no fmther objection from respondents, it must be concluded that Appellant was
witrjn his statute of limitations.

ISSUE TWO- Motion to Disqualify Judge Hurlbutt

l 0. Respondents rewrote Appellants issue concerning the motion to disqualify without cause
(R. 27) as "Did the district court err by denying Lightner ·s J..1otion for Disqual[fication of
Judge Hurlbutt without cause". {RB-3)
11. The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure clearly allows for the dismissal of a district Judge
without cause IRCP 40 (d)( 1).

In submitting this motion, as like all other motions,

Appellant filed the original motion with the clerk of the court. Then, with a Certificate of

Senrice, mailed an exact copy to the defense attorney (R. 27-29). The filing of this motion
was proper.

12. District Judge Hurlbutt denied this motion (which needed no cause) using the requirement
of IRCP 40 (d)(l)(H). stating that the moving party "shall mail'' a

copy of the motion

for disqualification to the presiding judge or magistrate at the judges residing
chambers" (R.38).
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
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13. Appellant's motion was filed with the clerk of the court as all other motions are filed.
Judge Hurlbutt does not have a separate address of resident chambers through which he
accepts mail in Ada County. Being an inmate Appellant had no resources available to him
of locating separate resident chambers for Judge Hurlbutt. It is known that Judge Hurlbutt
is not a sitting Judge in Ada county district court only a visiting judge. Therefore, it
should be clear to the court that the IRCP 40 (d)(l) motion was properly filed with the
court.
14. The denial of Appellant's IRCP 40 (d)( 1) motion was in err. Respondents claim the motion
was denied for not placing the court address on the Certificate of Service (AB 8). This
reason is not part of the record and should be stricken. As respondents argued above,
"Appellate court review is limited to the evidence, theories and arguments that were
presented below." Nelson v. Nelson 144 Id 710, 714, 170 P.3d 375,379 (2007). See also

Hansen v. Devanev 82 Id 488, 494, 356, P.2d 57, 60 (1960) (''Questions or mailers not
presented in the record will not he considered on appeal''). --11 is not the role of this court
to entertain new allegations of/act and consider ne1v evidence. " Huerta v. Huerta 127 Id
77, 80, 896, P.2d 985, 988 (Ct App 1995).

15. Respondent's explanation that the denial of Appellant· s Certificate of Service is not part of
the record. The '"Order denying Motion to Disqualify without cause'' states in its entirety
that "The plaintiff has filed a motion to disqualify the undersigned without cause pursuant
to IRCP 40(dj(J).

This motion is denied as the plainttfl has J,1iled lo comply with the

requirements of IRCP ./O(d)(l)(H) in submitting his motion." (R. 38).

16. A Certificate of Service is not mentioned in this court order and therefore respondenf s
explanation as not being part of the record must be rejected as ··NEW EV EDEN CE".
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17, Furthermore the reason given by the court does not mention a Certificate of Service. IRCP
40( d)( I )(H) states that the moving party " ... shall mail a copy of the motion for

disquahfication to the presiding judge or magistrate at the Judge's resident chambers. ··
IRCP 40(d)(l )(H) says nothing about the judge being listed, as an additional entry, as a
Certificate of Service requirement.
18. Appellant did mail the judge a copy. But not having a resident chamber in Ada County, it
was filed as all motions are filed with the clerk of the court. Furthermore, listing the court
on the Certificate of Service is not common practice. A Certificate of Service is to insure
the court that the opposing parties receive copies of all filings.
19. If a separate listing with the courts address is to be included on a Certificate of Service filed
with the court, then Appellant moves that both '·Rejpondents Brief· and ·'Motion to

Strike" are both in err, since neither Certificate of Service either from the Respondents
Brief- pg I 1 nor the Morion to Strike- pg 3 lists the court on the Certificate of Service.
20. If however, this court rules that the denial of Appellants Motion to Disqualify without
cause was proper. and the district court Judge should have dismissed himself: then all
following orders issued by the district court should be voided. This cru;e should not have
been dismissed and should be remanded back to the district court for trial.

ISSUE THREE- Did the District Court err in dismissing the case prematurely?
21. In both the respondents' argument (RB-3) and in the district court's Order of dismissal
(R.40) IC 31-3220 A (14) was used stating that "The court may dismiss an action or a

portion of an action under this section ... upon finding that... (b) the action is
.frivolous ... or ... (d) the action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. "
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22. The court went on to explain its reason for using sections (b) and (d) ofIC 31-3220 A ( 14)
in the footnotes of its Order to dismiss (R. 40).

For Section (b) the district court

determined that according to JC 12-122 .. brought _frivolously" means that the action was

''based upon which either had no basis infacr or. even #lthe.fi:.1ctual allegations were true,
they did not, as a matter of law, just{/j; any relief .. ··
23. Appellant claims that a lack of case law to support the claim does not make it frivoious. At
one point in time, there was no such thing as a Miranda law. Does that mean that (prior to
the Miranda case) asking for appointment of counsel was a frivolous request?
24. The district court held in referencing a refund of the collected parole fees that .. What little

law there is on this subject supports the proposition that a state may require a prisoner to
pay the cost

o_l supervision

as a condition of parole... There is no Supreme Court CCL'ie

holding or even hinting to the contrary" Woodle v. Department of Corrections 74 F.
Supp. 2d 623. 627 (E. D. Va. 1999) (R. 42).
25. The district court went on to state that, "Thefi.1ct that the parole commission did not credit

the plaintffJ._~ sentencefhr the time he was on parole is ofno consequence here and there is
no case of which the court is aware anywhere in the United States. that supports the
plaint(fji assertion that he is entitled to ··refimd'' ,~fhis parole supervisionfees. under these
circumstances.,. (R. 42)
26. Appellant concurs with these statements, only as far as. that if parole credit is given, the
parolee can be charged a cost of supervision fee to offset the cost of supervision. The
argument here, and appealed to this court is not whether a fee can be charged when parole
credit IS given but whether this fee can be charged when parole credit IS NOT given. A
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lack of case law does not make this issue any more frivolous than asking for an attorney
was frivolous, prior to Miranda.
27. Some refer to the courts as the --Legal'' system while other might say the ··Justice" system.
These terms are much too often contrary to one another. The dictionary defines the word
--Legal" as being based on, required by, or permitted by law.

It says nothing about being

right or wrong. Contrarily. the dictionary defines the word ·'Justice" as doing what is right,
or to treat fairly. In this case, the district court failed to provide justice because they found
a lack of law.
28. Appellant's seeking of Justice is not frivolous. If the parole commission exercises the
authority given to them by IC 20-228, in refusing to count time served on parole when a
parolee violates the conditions of parole that is not only legal. but just. On the other hand,
if the parole commission exercises the authority given to them by IC 20-228 in refusing to
count time served on parole when there were no violations. Then the service was not
provided and a refund of the fees collected is applicable and not frivolous. To not refund
the fraudulently collected fees wouid be unjust.
29. In the district court's footnote concerning (d) " .. .a claim upon which relief can be

:,,11·anted. ''

It states, "The court... must determine whether the [plaim{fj] has alleged

su/jicient facts in support of his claim, which if true, would entitle him to relief .. "
Brooksbv v. Geico General Insurance Co. 153 Idaho 546,547,286 P.3d 182. 183 (RAO).

30. In respondent's Standard of Review, its stated that " ... the Idaho Court c~f Appeals

determined that dismissal fi,r failure to state a claim pursuant to IC 31-3220 A (14)(d)
should be reviewed in the same manner as a dismissal to state a claim pursuant to, IRCP
l 2(b)(6) ... " (RB-4).
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3 L IRCP Rule 12 (b)(6) states in relevant part that ·· ... all parties shall he given reasonable
opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by rule 56. "

32. The basic instruction given for filing a 1983 civil suit is that argument and case law are not
to be used in the initial filings. These come in the later pleadings of motions. responses to
motions, and briefs. In examining IRCP 12 (b)(6) the rule states that Appellant should
have been "·given reasonable opportunity'' to clarify his claim in responding to the Motion
to Dismiss, and to present his argument .When plaintiff was denied a reasonable
opportunity it was a violation of Due Process.
33. While IC 31-3220 A (! 4) allows the court to dismiss a case on its own volition, once
respondents filed their Motion to Dismiss, Appeliant was entitled by law to due process and
had a Constitutional right to respond.
34. The record shows that respondents "Motion to Dismiss'" was filed on the 11 th day of
October 20i3 and the court issued its '·Order of Dismissal just four (4) days later on the
15 th day of October. (R. 2) Being incarcerated. with the 1ih and 13 th day of October being
a weekend, and the 14th of Ociober 2013 being Columbus Day, Appellant did not even
receive his copy of the Motion to Dismiss until the 15th of October. a day "AFTER" the
district court had issued its Order of Dismissal. This allowed the district court to make a
review of the defendants Motion to Dismiss and write a concurring order, without allowing
due process to Appellant.
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ISSUE FOUR- The claim which relief can be granted.
35. As stated above. it has not been disputed that Appellant paid his cost of supervision fees.
Nor that those fees were paid for the service of receiving parole credits.

36. The record also shows that the $600.00 in question was not collected as a one-time fee, but
was collected on individual month to month contracts at $50.00 per month. (R.14 para 19)

37. This cost of supervision fee is intended to offset and provide the service necessary to offer
inmates parole. (This is charged and paid by the parolee on a month to month basis. or
month to month contract.)

If a parole violation occurs, IC 20-228 provides that the

commission has fuH discretion only over the ·'TIME'. credited. (R.41)

38. The matter at hand is not a matter of "TIME'\ but a "MONlTARY" issue.

39. IC 20-228 provides that the parole commission has complete authority and discretion over
parole "TIME., calculations on what "TIME'' is credited, and what ·TIME'. is forfeited.
However, IC 20-228 does not give the parole commission the same "Monetary'' authority
(emphasis added). There is nothing in IC 20-228 that grants the commission any authority
to charge a monthly cost of supervision fee without providing the parole credit.

40. In this case, the record shows that Appellant; during his two periods of parole was a parolee
for a total of 14 months, ranging from January 2004, to October of 2005. (R. 13-14)
Over that time, he seeks "MONITARY" reimbursement of $600.00 for the monetary fees
he paid when time credit was not given. To be continually charged for something not
received is cruel and unusual.
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41. Appellant claims that this month to month service fee is in effectual reality, a month to
month contract, (R. 17). The first party, the parolee pays the fee, and while remaining on
parole, is required to abide its rules. Tbe second parties. the defendants, agree to provide
the service of supervision, and the monthly "TIME" credit toward completion of the
sentence being served. At the commencement of each month, a new fee is paid, a.11d a new
contract begin---5.

42. If the parolee violates the conditions of parole, he/she has violated their portion of the
contract. A revocation hearing is set. and the commission exercises, according to IC 20228, their discretion over the parolee's parole status, and "'TIME" calculation.

43. Appellant claims that is however, the parole commission decides to exercise the discretion
given to them by IC 20-228 and not provide the "TIME" credit for the months in which
there were no violations, then they failed to uphold their end of the contract and have
unjustly violated the "MONITARY" terms and conditions of the month to montli conLracts.

(R. 41)

44. Appellant claims that having paid for and successfully completing parole for eleven (11)
He abided by the terms of the agreement, and also paid for, and attended treatment.

Appellant does concede that having not successfully completed parole, but having
violations in 3 of the 14 months, Appellant did not uphold his end of the contract during

those three months and without the "TIME" being credited, also forfeited his
"'l'v1ONITARY" investment for those 3 months.

45. Legally, the defendants have the full authority of IC 20-228 and have a legal right with
their own discretion to not count any of the 14 months Appellant was on parole whether the
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month had a violation or not, but in choosing of their own free will not to count the 11
months Appeiiant successfully completed, they failed to provide the monthly TIME credit
for v.rhich they were MON ITARILY paid. (R. 41)

Defendants must therefore refund the

fees coIJected from the successful completed months they chose not to count for breaking
their portion of the contract.

To not do so, would result in an unjust condition of

confinement and crate a cruel and unusual condition.
46. AppeJlant claims reimbursement of the 11 months he was "MONETARILY" charged for
and not credited his "TIME" for (12 months reimbursement is being sought because of two
payments collected for partial months at the beginning of his two periods of parole).
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CONCLUSION
It should be clear, that for justice in this case to be served~ it must be ruled that District
Court Judge Hurlbutt should have excused himself from the case once receiving AppeJlants
IRCP 40(d)(l) Motion that having received an ICRP 40 {d)(l) Motion to Disqualify
•.vithout cause, the court should not have issued fwther Orders. 1be Order of dismissal was
premature in not allowing Appellant the opportunity to respond.

Also, that IC 20-228,

while giving the parole commission compiete TIME authority, does not give them the

same MONITARY power.

Appellant prays that this Court recognizes the due process violations and cruel and
unusual conditions, and reverses the district court decision and Order, and grants Appellant
reimbursement of fees, or in the alternative remands this case back to District Court for
trial.

DATED this _L day of March, 20i4.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on thisi_ day of March 2014, I mailed a true and correct copy of the

APPELLANTS REPLY BREIF via the US mail system to:

OFFICE OF THE ATIORNEY GENERAL
CIVIL DIVISION, APPELLATE UNIT
POBOX87320
BOISE, ID 83720-0010
KARIN MAGNELLI ISB 8929

Deputy Attorney General
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